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Abstract. The emergence of cryptocurrencies has been one of the most notable monetary phenomenon of the last decade. Many 
academics and analysts have found a clear precedent to this event in Friedrich Hayek’s latest monetary work, Denationalization of 
money. The aim of this article is to analyze what we can learn about cryptocurrencies by re-reading this book. As will be proven, Hayek 
would surely have rejected the idea that Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies with similar characteristics could be accepted as money in the 
market. Furthermore, this paper will prove that a very close connection between Stablecoins and private money exists, in the line with 
the Austrian economist’s predictions in a context of monetary competition.
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[es] Hayek y la revolución de las criptomonedas
Resumen. La irrupción de las criptomonedas ha sido uno de los fenómenos monetarios más notables de la última década. Muchos 
académicos y analistas han encontrado un claro antecedente a este acontecimiento en la última obra monetaria de Friedrich Hayek, 
Denationalization of money. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar qué podemos aprender sobre las criptomonedas a través de la 
relectura de esta obra. Como se demostrará, Hayek rechazaría que el Bitcoin y criptomonedas de características similares puedan llegar 
a ser aceptadas como dinero en el mercado. Además, se mostrará que existe una conexión muy estrecha entre las Stablecoins y el dinero 
privado que el economista austriaco predice que surgiría en un contexto de competencia monetaria. 
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1. Introduction
1 Universidad Católica de Ávila Doctor of Economics and lecturer of the Catholic University of Avila. E-mail: david.sanz@ucavila.es. The author 
expresses his gratitude for the comments of the anonymous referees.  
2 For example, Mark Carney (2019), governor of the Bank of England, has said, in a meeting of central bank governors that, talking about cryp-
tocurrencies, “Technology has the potential to disrupt the network externalities that prevent the incumbent global reserve currency from being 
displaced.”
The irruption of cryptocurrencies has been one of 
the most surprising events of the last decade in the 
money world. Initially, cryptocurrencies were seen as 
a modern curiosity, and even as an eccentricity. At 
the time, these products were considered one more 
example of irrational exuberance that had given rise 
to an enormous, worldwide bubble; now, a growing 
number of people believe that they will condition the 
future of the international monetary system2.
Among other consequences, cryptocurrencies 
have reanimated interest in Denationalization of 
money (1990), the bold work that Friedrich Hayek 
published in 1976. For many, this book is a clear 
harbinger of this new monetary phenomenon. In this 
work, the Austrian economist theorised about how 
a competitive money-emission market would be or-
ganised and what the consequences would be for the 
economic world.
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The aim of this article is to analyse the phenom-
enon of cryptocurrencies from the viewpoint of the 
theoretical construction offered in Denationalization 
of money. Although this work belongs to a different 
era, the results obtained are highly gratifying. As we 
shall see, it must be noted that Bitcoin and similar 
cryptocurrencies would have characteristics that, ac-
cording to Hayek’s reasoning, would prevent them 
being accepted by the market as substitutes for state 
fiat currencies. Moreover, we shall insist that these 
cryptocurrencies can have the effect of accelerating 
inflation in countries suffering convulsive situations.
At the same time, we have found a clear paral-
lel between the companies issuing Stablecoins and 
banks that issue private currency in Hayek’s model. 
Starting with this connection, we shall analyse De-
nationalization of money, to see what it can teach us 
about this type of cryptocurrency. We believe that 
this contributes to the existing literature on crypto-
currencies. 
Throughout this article, we shall use the follow-
ing scheme. In section 2 we shall provide a summary 
of Denationalization of money, indicating its main 
weaknesses. In parallel, we shall briefly explain how 
cryptocurrencies have emerged and we shall offer a 
classification of them that will help us throughout 
this work. In the last part of this section, we shall in-
dicate the main points connecting the phenomenon of 
cryptocurrencies and Hayek’s work. In section 3 we 
shall study the first group of cryptocurrencies, which 
we have designated as Bitcoin and the Altcoins. In 
section 4, we shall analyse the second group of cryp-
tocurrencies, the Stablecoins. Finally, in section 5, 
we shall set out the main conclusions of this work. 
2. Denationalization of money and cryptocurrencies
2.1. Context and main ideas of Denationalization 
of money
Friedrich Hayek wrote about monetary issues during 
his entire academic life. The study of his work on 
currency demonstrates that his understanding of the 
essence and function of money followed a constant 
path (cf. White 1999). Specifically, the impossibility 
of a neutral currency, lack of confidence in the ca-
pacity of governments to administer money correct-
ly and his rejection of competitive devaluations and 
monetary policy as a means to stimulate production 
are ideas that we find repeatedly in all of his works 
on this subject. However, his prescriptions for mone-
tary policy did change over the years. In the course of 
his work, he proposed different institutional frame-
works, all conceived to limit abuse of currency by 
governments and so, according to his view, permit 
the harmonious progress of the economic process. 
Denationalization of money is the end of his 
search. Clearly, this monetary proposal emerges from 
his concept of the market as a discovery process. In 
essence, in his judgement, the problem of secular in-
flation is a result of the lack of competition in the 
monetary world, so this would end if free circulation 
of the state fiat currencies existing in different ter-
ritories were to be permitted and, at the same time, 
companies were allowed to issue private currencies. 
According to Hayek, this institutional framework 
would oblige the different issuers (public and private) 
to provide a currency with a stable purchasing power. 
In this way, the incentives for over-issuing would dis-
appear and the market would be allowed to discov-
er which currency was best at each moment in time. 
Moreover, because of this, the Austrian economist 
predicted that Keynesian-inspired monetary policies 
would disappear, and as a result, States would have 
to maintain a strict fiscal policy. In addition, Hayek 
thought that there would be currencies that would be 
used outside the political frontiers of countries, and 
that this would eliminate the traditional balance of 
payments problems, leading to greater worldwide 
economic integration.
Denationalization of money was published during 
the decomposition of the Bretton Woods monetary 
system (1973) (Eichengreen 2000, cap. 4). At that 
time, there was enormous concern regarding the ef-
fects of inflation on economic activity and debate on 
what could be done to limit it. Hayek’s proposal had 
a great impact among professionals, and gave rise to 
heated debates on monetary questions (cf. Howard 
1977; Friedman and Schwartz 1987; Issing, White 
and Vaubel 2000; Kelsey 2003; Ferris and Galbraith 
2006; Endres 2009; Luther 2013; Fantacci 2019). 
However, Denationalization of money does have 
at least two weak points. Firstly, it does not consider 
the importance of network effects and the informa-
tion costs related to money. The Austrian economist 
imagined that, with a suitable institutional frame-
work, the competition between different currencies 
would be very strong, since users of money (i.e., 
the clients of the issuing companies or institutions) 
would change to a different currency even in the 
case of minor changes in its purchasing power (cf. 
Hayek 1990, 116). However, the public has a great-
er tolerance to inflation that is assumed in Denation-
alization of Money. Milton Friedman (1984) con-
sidered that individuals would only seek alternative 
currencies when they suffered from serious levels 
of inflation. As empirical proof, Friedman referred 
to the monetary experience in Mexico at the start 
of the 1980s. In this country, there was considera-
ble freedom to use foreign currencies, but despite 
this, only when there was heavy inflation, a partial 
dollarization took place (approximately 20% of the 
monetary mass) (cf. Echarte 2019, cap. 3; Luther 
2016). It can thus be said that, up to a point, mon-
ey functions as a natural monopoly in the area in 
which it is used. For this reason, currency issuers 
have a certain degree of freedom to obtain seignior-
age benefits before currency substitution processes 
commence.
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Secondly, Hayek assumes that the legalisation of 
competition between currencies would lead to the in-
evitable end of many state fiat currencies, given the 
superiority of private companies to protect the stabil-
ity of the purchasing power of their own currencies. 
However, there are reasons to doubt the alleged infe-
riority of state fiat currencies (Claeys et al. 2018, 8). 
In the first place, this analysis overlooks that fact that 
state currencies are used to pay taxes, and that this is 
an important factor in the stability of the demand for 
them. In second place, in recent decades, developed 
societies have implemented a series of institutional 
rules that offer central banks incentives and good 
practices that maintain the stability of their curren-
cies. Proof of this are the low rates of inflation seen 
in developed countries since 1990. Finally, countries 
form part of global institutions that can provide them 
with sufficient financing to defend their state curren-
cies if needed.
Despite these weak points, Hayek’s analysis has a 
freshness and a sharpness that maintains its relevance 
even today. In addition, it must be noted that Dena-
tionalization of money is not simply a proposal for 
monetary policy. It can be considered Hayek’s mon-
etary legacy since it expresses his most refined and 
mature understanding of how money works.
2.2. The cryptocurrency universe
Cryptocurrencies are offspring of the digital revolu-
tion that has taken place over the last few decades. 
They could be defined as a type of digital currency 
that is based on cryptography and on the Blockchain 
technology. These technologies allow the creation of 
new monetary units to be decentralised and guaran-
tee a fund transfer system that is quick, simple, rel-
atively anonymous and, above all, transparent. Their 
most notable characteristic, apart from their intangi-
bility, is that they are developed without needing to 
be controlled by Central Banks or other institutions 
(Gomá 2018; MacKenzie 2019, cap. 1-3; Ammous 
2018, cap. 8). 
We must realise, however, that cryptocurrencies 
are not free of controversy. In many cases, they have 
been used to evade taxes, to launder money or for 
illegal transactions (cf. Náñez 2019; Cheah and Fry 
2015). At the same time, possession of these “alpha-
numeric codes” is not risk-free for their owners since 
cases of robbery and fraud have been detected. De-
spite this, cryptocurrencies have made their way into 
our globalised world and, the way things are going, it 
does not look like a passing fad.
The first and most famous cryptocurrency was 
Bitcoin, launched in 2009. The popularity of this 
currency grew quickly. Subsequently, many more 
cryptocurrencies have appeared, with different 
characteristics and functionality. In April 2020, 
CoinMarketCap had more than 5,000 cryptocur-
rencies registered. Despite this impressive number, 
the market is still dominated by Bitcoin (See Chart 
1).
Chart 1: Market quota of the main cryptocurrencies by market capitalisation 
Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/
The universe of cryptocurrencies is enormous and 
grows day by day. As there is no consensus regarding 
the classification of the different types, in this article 
we shall use a functional classification:
1) Altcoins: Their name is an abbreviation of the 
expression “alternative to Bitcoin”. Sometimes, this 
name is used to refer to any cryptocurrency other 
than Bitcoin. However, we shall only use it to refer to 
those that are like Bitcoin. We shall include all cryp-
tocurrencies whose main characteristic is their de-
centralised creation. These cryptocoins are regulated 
by an algorithm that determines the rate of growth of 
the money supply and hence, is not controlled by any 
state, bank, financial institution or company. Gener-
ally, additional monetary units are created through a 
decentralised network of “miners” and each crypto-
currency possesses its own Blockchain. Examples of 
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this type of cryptocurrency are Bitcoin Cash, Lite-
coin, XRP, EOS, etc. 
2) Stablecoins: These cryptocurrencies are de-
signed to try to correct the problem of the volatility of 
the trading values of Bitcoins and Altcoins. In gener-
al, the issuing company of each Stablecoin oversees 
the stability of its purchasing power. Examples of this 
type of cryptocurrency are Tether, Dai, USD Coin, 
USDx Stablecoin, etc.
3) Tokens: Cryptocurrencies designed for specific 
functions that are only operative within the platform 
in which they have been created. For example, there 
are Exchange Tokens that have been created by cryp-
tocurrency exchange platforms, whose objective is to 
facilitate traffic within these platforms (e.g., Binance 
Coin, Huobi Token and KuCoin).
4) Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs): 
Presently, several Central Banks are considering 
the creation of a digital version of their currencies 
or have already done so. There are various motives 
for this, and perhaps, soon, state fiat currencies will 
cease to have a physical format (cf. Quian 2019; 
Bindseil 2019).
In this work, we will concentrate on analysing the 
first and second group from the viewpoint of Dena-
tionalization of Money. 
2.3. The connection between Denationalization of 
money and cryptocurrencies
As we have said, Denationalization of money is a 
work of reference as regards the emergence of cryp-
tocurrencies (cf. Gaurav 2019; ECB 2012, 22). In 
this work, although Hayek made his own predictions 
about how a competitive currency-issuing market 
would develop, he alerted his readers as to the inno-
vative and disruptive character of the market process. 
In his words, “A hope one may cherish is that, as com-
petition usually does, it will lead to the discovery of 
yet unknown possibilities in currency” (Hayek 1990, 
126; cf. Huerta de Soto 2005, chap. 2 and 2009, chap. 
1). The surprising development of the cryptocurrency 
market is entirely in line with this statement.
The links between Denationalization of money 
and cryptocurrencies are notable. We can mention 
here at least four clear connections: 
a. Philosophy: Cryptocurrencies and Hayek’s pro-
posal imply openly questioning the prerogative of 
governments to be the sole issuers of money (cf. 
Nakamoto 2008). 
b. Competition between currencies: Just like money 
in Hayek’s model, cryptocurrencies are not legal 
tender, and their implantation in the market is 
based on voluntary acceptance by the parties.
c. Rejection of traditional monetary policy: The 
monetary rule of most cryptocurrencies is fixed 
and independent of arbitrary factors and political 
interests. Similarly, Hayek considered that the 
competitive process would lead currency issuers 
—public and private— to protect the interests of 
their clients and forego discretionary monetary 
policies that could place the value of the different 
currencies at risk.
d. Confidence in the issuer is substituted by other ele-
ments: In existing fiat currency systems, the credi-
bility of the issuer has played a central role. In De-
nationalization of money, Hayek proposes replacing 
confidence in a monopolistic issuer with the guaran-
tee of a competitive process, that is, by mutual over-
sight of the various issuers (public and private) in 
their struggle to maintain and increase their market 
share. For cryptocurrencies this also happens, as we 
shall see, with Stablecoins. In the case of Bitcoin 
and Altcoins, confidence has been replaced by issu-
ing money with an inalterable algorithm and cryp-
tographic proof of transfer (Nakamoto 2008). 
3. Decentralised cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin and 
Altcoins
3.1. What are Bitcoin and Altcoins?
When designing Bitcoin, the goal of Satoshi Naka-
moto —or of the team of programmers hidden be-
hind this pseudonym— was to create an alternative 
currency that was independent of States. Despite this, 
many experts and analysts believe that cryptocurren-
cies are not currently money, but rather digital assets. 
This view has been expressed by the European 
Central Bank (ECB 2015, 23-24):
From an economic perspective, the virtual curren-
cies currently known about do not fully meet all three 
functions of money defined in economic literature: i) 
medium of exchange (…); ii) store of value (…); and 
iii) unit of account (…). Indeed, certainly in the case of 
Bitcoin, (…), virtual currencies have a limited function 
as a medium of exchange because they have a very low 
level of acceptance among the public. In addition, the 
high volatility of their exchange rates to currencies – 
and therefore in terms of most goods and services – 
renders virtual currency useless as a store of value even 
for short-time purposes, let alone for the purpose of be-
ing a longer-term savings instrument. Finally, both the 
low level of acceptance and the high volatility of their 
exchange rates and thus purchasing power make them 
unsuitable as a unit of account. Therefore, although it 
cannot be excluded that more stable virtual currencies 
will emerge and be used by a much wider group of us-
ers, [cryptocurrencies] such as Bitcoin cannot be re-
garded as full forms of money at the moment.
The concept of money presented by Hayek in 
Denationalization of money could enrich the com-
prehension of the monetary dimension of crypto-
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currencies. According to him, “although we usually 
assume there is a sharp line of distinction between 
what is money and what is not, and the law general-
ly tries to make such a distinction so far as the caus-
al effects of monetary events are concerned, there 
is no such clear difference. What we find is rather 
a continuum in which objects of various degrees of 
liquidity, or with values which can fluctuate inde-
pendently of each other, shade into each other in the 
degree to which they function as money” (Hayek 
1990, 56). In fact, the Austrian economist consid-
ered that it is better to use the term money as an 
adjective, rather than a noun; this implies that some 
goods would possess a greater degree of “money-
ness” than others. 
Within this framework, we can consider Bitcoin 
and the other Altcoins as assets in the process of be-
coming monetised (cf. Rallo 2013). Whether these 
assets can become consolidated in world markets as 
a generally used means of exchange is, of course, still 
to be seen. 
Based on their behaviour in recent years, we can 
undoubtedly say that Bitcoin and the other Altcoins 
show a tendency to improve their monetary quality. 
Evidently, their use as a means of exchange is still 
marginal, but there are clear examples that lead us to 
think that progress is being made. For example,
• Despite the growing number of people who pos-
sess cryptocurrency, the most important on-line 
marketplaces (Amazon, eBay, Walmart, etc.) 
do not accept cryptocurrencies in their systems. 
This has given rise to business opportunities for 
companies that mediate between owners of cryp-
tocurrency and these marketplaces. For example, 
Alagoria3 allows users to buy in Walmart and 
HomeDepot; Forra4 facilitates Ebay purchases; 
Olodolo5 can be used in Aliexpress, etc.
• Many debit cards allow their owners to use their 
cryptocurrency to purchase real goods and ser-
vices. Among these, we can cite Basecoin Card, 
Wirex Visa Card, Cryptopay, Uquid, MCO Visa 
Card, SpectroCoin Card, Revolut Virtual Card, 
BitPay, etc. Each of these cards has its own char-
acteristics, such as the number of countries in 
which they can be used, the cryptocurrencies they 
support and their policies as regards commissions. 
In each case, different financial operators have 






7 Website: https://coinmap.org/ 
8 As we shall see, these characteristics are very different from those of the other group of cryptocurrencies that we have mentioned, Stablecoins.
9 In fact, Hayek (1990, 109) considered that the role of gold in the case of currencies backed by this metal was poorly understood. “It ought by now 
of course to be generally understood that the value of a currency redeemable in gold (or in another currency) is not derived from the value of that 
gold, but merely kept at the same value through the automatic regulation of its quantity.”
• Several websites advertise businesses where pay-
ment can be made in cryptocurrencies. Generally, 
these sites allow users to search for sellers that 
accept cryptocurrencies, filtered by product cat-
egory and geographic area. Among these, we can 
name BitcoinPeople6 and Coinmap7. Many organ-
isations also accept donations in cryptocurrencies.
In view of all this, even if it cannot be said that 
Bitcoin and the other Altcoins are commonly ac-
cepted means of payment, we believe their use is 
undoubtedly increasing. Thus, based on Hayek’s the-
oretical structure, it can be said that Bitcoin and the 
other Altcoins are assets in the process of being mon-
etised, that is, their liquidity is increasing.
Furthermore, following the work of Juan Ramón 
Rallo (2019b), we can add that this type of cryptocur-
rency8 has the following characteristics:
• They are real assets, since they are not the finan-
cial liabilities of any economic agent (bank, com-
pany, state, etc.). Individuals who possess Bitcoin 
monetary units are the owners of a unique alpha-
numeric code that they can exchange with whoev-
er they wish, whenever they wish.
• They are intangible or digital assets.
• They are decentralised assets, due to the form in 
which they are issued —there is no single issu-
er— and to the way in which users exchange pay-
ments, via a public validation process based on 
consensus (Blockchain).
• They are private assets, since they have emerged 
from a private initiative, and not from a state.
The source of the value of Bitcoins and the Alt-
coins has frequently been debated. It is often alleged 
that their value is entirely fictitious or speculative, 
since there is no real asset that supports the value of 
these cryptocurrencies. Consequently, it is often said 
that the intrinsic value of these currencies is zero (cf. 
Fernández-Villaverde 2018). 
In Denationalization of money we find an answer 
to this. In Hayek’s opinion (1990, 111), “Money is val-
ued because, and in so far as, it is known to be scarce, 
and is for this reason likely to be accepted at the going 
value by others. And any money which is voluntarily 
used only because it is trusted to be kept scarce by the 
issuer, and which will be held by people only so long 
as the issuer justifies that trust, will increasingly con-
firm its acceptability at the established value”9.
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Bitcoins and Altcoins have the property of pos-
sessing an absolute scarcity, since the number of 
units of these cryptocurrencies is fixed and inalter-
able, being determined by an algorithm. This is the 
basis of the confidence of their users. Thus, following 
Hayek’s reasoning, this undeniable and irrevocable 
scarcity makes it possible for these currencies to have 
a market value and to be exchanged by users (Ammo-
us 2018, 237-238).
For example, Bitcoin is programmed so that the 
maximum number of monetary units is equivalent to 
21 million bitcoins. Specifically, the algorithm that 
regulates this cryptocurrency determines that new 
bitcoins are constantly generated at a rate of approxi-
mately one every 10 minutes until this amount is 
reached. Its programmed growth allows us to calcu-
late that, by the year 2140, all the bitcoins that can 
exist will have been generated. Since this cannot be 
changed, it generates confidence for the users of this 
currency who know that there is a finite number of 
monetary units10.
At this point, we should nuance the relationship 
between Hayek and Bitcoins/Altcoins. Generally, 
as we have said, Hayek is considered the intellec-
tual father of cryptocurrencies. This is obvious from 
their underlying philosophy, the disruption that they 
imply, and their private and competitive character. 
Nevertheless, as regards Bitcoin and Altcoin crypto-
currencies, if we look at their fixed monetary rule, 
the clearest connection that we can find is with Mil-
ton Friedman, who argued that the monetary supply 
should increase at a fixed, inalterable rate (Friedman 
and Schwartz 1987; cf. Fantacci 2019). However, as 
we shall argue below, Stablecoins are like the money 
that Hayek thought would emerge in a competitive 
market of monetary issuance. 
3.2. Are Bitcoin and Altcoins fully monetisable?
Following the theoretical framework provided by 
Hayek, Bitcoin and Altcoins are assets in the process 
of monetisation that derive their value from their ab-
solute scarcity. Now we shall study the stability of 
their purchasing power and the perspectives for this 
type of cryptocurrency to achieve full monetisation.
The experience of the last decade shows that the 
exchange rates of Bitcoin and Altcoins have been 
highly volatile. From the perspective of the moneti-
10 It would be a mistake to deduce that Hayek is forgetting the important role played by the assets possessed by a currency-issuing bank. Obviously, 
the quality of the assets against which the currency is issued is essential to manage its purchasing power in the market. That is, it is not the same for 
the issuing bank to possess gold or dollars as it is to possess a mortgage that may possibly not be paid. As we shall see below, Hayek offers several 
indications regarding how issuing banks should manage their assets. In the case of Bitcoins and Altcoins, this is irrelevant, since there is no issuing 
bank, that is, these cryptocurrencies are intangible and decentralized assets. However, as we shall see, in the case of Stablecoins, whose nature is 
that of financial liabilities, these considerations are relevant.
11 Digital Asset Data specialises in the analysis of the cryptocurrency market (website: https://www.digitalassetsdata.com/).
12 As a theoretical exercise, we could imagine a world in which the market only used Bitcoins as money. If we assume that financial institutions would 
not be able to use fractional reserve banking, the money supply would be fixed and this monetary system would be similar to a pure cash system. 
In this scenario, if the velocity of money were constant, there would be a process of secular deflation as the size of the economy grew; obviously, 
in situations in which money circulated more quickly, prices could rise. Presumably, in this world, the purchasing power of Bitcoin would tend 
to increase over time. However, if we assume that financial institutions could expand the monetary supply via a fractional reserve banking, this 
monetary framework would be similar to the classic gold standard system and prices would have a certain degree of instability (cf. Hayek 1990, 
123-124; Huerta de Soto 2011, caps. 4-6; Hayek 1989; Claeys et al. 2018, 9-10).
sation of these cryptocurrencies, this has two conse-
quences, but in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
their volatility has been essential in popularising Bit-
coin and the Altcoins among people who see them as 
an opportunity to make quick profits. On the other 
hand, however, this is a serious problem when it co-
mes to monetising them in the market. 
The origin of this volatility can be found, of cour-
se, in the monetary rules of these cryptocurrencies 
that, as said previously, have a fixed, inalterable 
monetary supply. This rigidity prevents a dynamic 
equilibrium between supply and demand for each of 
them. Since the money supply is rigid, when demand 
increases (or decreases), its exchange rate in dollars 
or other state fiat currency increases (or decreases).
In Denationalization of Money, Hayek argues that 
the key element for a currency to be accepted on a 
large scale by the market is the stability of its pur-
chasing power. In fact, Hayek (1990, 51-53) predicts 
that, in the context of monetary competition, curren-
cies with the most stable purchasing power will be 
the winners.
Because of this, following Hayek’s theory, we can 
say that Bitcoin and the Altcoins will never achieve a 
high degree of monetisation. Few people are willing 
to be paid in a means of payment that can lose a con-
siderable percentage of its value in a few hours. For 
something to be an international monetary reference 
and have a presence in everyday economic exchan-
ges, its purchasing power must be highly stable.
It is true that the liquidity or degree of monetisa-
tion of this type of cryptocurrency has improved over 
time. However, it must be said that businesses that 
accept payment in these cryptocurrencies are not as-
suming an exchange risk. The system works “just as 
Visa and Mastercard enable merchants to accept cre-
dit and debit cards from customers whose accounts 
are denominated in a foreign currency” (White 2015, 
385). 
At the same time, it must be stressed that a lar-
ge part of the demand for Bitcoin and the Altcoins 
is completely speculative. Proof of this is the high 
number of inactive Bitcoin accounts; specifically, 
according to a study by Digital Asset Data11, during 
2019, 60% of the existing bitcoins had not been used 
in any transaction (NewsBitcoin.com 13/Jan/2020; 
cf. Cheah and Fry 2015, 34)12.
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A comparison between Bitcoin/Altcoins and state 
fiat currencies shows the great differences between 
these two groups of currencies. Particularly, modern 
Central Banks have achieved stability in the value of 
their currencies by intervening in the monetary mar-
ket. If a currency shows a tendency to increase in va-
lue, the monetary authority will generally buy assets 
to inject a greater quantity of the currency, and vice 
versa13. 
Thus, it seems obvious that, even if they had a 
sufficiently stable network of users, the algorithms 
behind Bitcoin and the Altcoins make it impossible 
to achieve a dynamic equilibrium between the supply 
and the demand. According to Hayek’s schemes, the-
se cryptocurrencies will never achieve full moneti-
sation.
3.3. What could the role of Bitcoin and the Alt-
coins be?
If we accept the theoretical framework proposed by 
Hayek, Bitcoin and the Altcoins cannot replace state 
fiat currencies. However, this does not mean that they 
cannot have —or, rather, that they do not have— a 
role to play. 
In Denationalization of Money, one can deduce 
that there are parallels between the role of gold in 
Hayek’s system and the potential destiny of Bitcoin 
and the Altcoins. As we know, his proposal consisted 
in liberalising the circulation of national currencies 
and in permitting different agents to issue private 
currencies, including the possibility of issuing coins 
made of gold or other metals. Hayek is categorical 
about the possibilities of gold becoming a currency 
in general use:
It may be that, with free competition between dif-
ferent kinds of money, gold coins might at first prove 
to be the most popular. However, this very fact, the in-
creasing demand for gold, would probably lead to such 
a rise (and perhaps violent fluctuations) of the price 
of gold that, though it might still be widely used for 
hoarding, it would soon cease to be convenient as the 
unit for business transactions and accounting. There 
should certainly be the same freedom for its use, but I 
should not expect this to lead to its victory over other 
forms of privately issued money, the demand for which 
rested on its quantity being successfully regulated to 
keep its purchasing power constant.
The very same fact which at present makes gold 
more trusted than government-controlled paper money, 
namely that its total quantity cannot be manipulated at 
will in the service of political aims, would in the long 
run make it appear inferior to token money used by 
13 We should remember how the implementation and consolidation of state fiat currencies has progressed: “The state had been instrumental in ensuring 
the ascendance of fiat money. To build a network of users, states often resorted to some sort of backing, originally in the form of a non-financial asset 
with intrinsic value (commodity money, e.g. gold) and/or coercion. This took the form of legal tender (i.e. the mandatory acceptance of banknotes 
and coins for their full face-value to make payments and to discharge debt) or the obligation to pay taxes in the official currencies. But once the 
network is established and consolidated, as long as its participants maintain trust in the stability of the currency, backing and coercion become less 
important” (Claeys et al. 2018, 6).
competing institutions whose business rested on suc-
cessfully so regulating the quantity of their issues as 
to keep the value of the units approximately constant” 
(Hayek 1990, 130-131).
In fact, and in line with Ametrano (2016, 20), if 
we replace the word “gold” with “Bitcoin” in the 
above quote, we obtain a very accurate description of 
the behaviour of this cryptocurrency. Clearly, Bitcoin 
and the Altcoins can be considered “digital gold”. In 
this sense, their failure to become widely accepted 
currencies may be empirical proof of Hayek’s hy-
pothesis that purchasing power stability is essential 
for a private currency to be accepted by the public.
If we assume that Bitcoin and the Altcoins are 
digital reserve assets with a certain degree of liquid-
ity, then there are least two opportunities for their 
use: 
Firstly, Bitcoin and the Altcoins could potentially 
be used massively by citizens in countries with con-
vulsive economic and social situations who want to 
protect their personal wealth. There was a recent ex-
ample of this in Argentina. In August 2019, Mauricio 
Macri suffered a significant and unexpected defeat 
by his adversary, Alberto Fernández, in the primary 
elections known as PASO. This caused the Argen-
tinian Peso to depreciate strongly with respect to 
the dollar, going from 45 pesos per dollar on August 
11 to 60 pesos per dollar on 15 August. At the same 
time, the peso depreciated strongly with respect to 
Bitcoin, from 511,044 pesos per bitcoin on August 
11 to 604,016 pesos per bitcoin on August 14. Sim-
ilar behaviour can also be seen in other countries, 
such as Venezuela, Turkey, South Africa, Iran, etc., in 
which citizens have found a different way to protect 
their wealth in the face of political uncertainty. Ac-
cording to Hayek’s teachings, this new gateway for 
capital evasion will generate a tendency to accelerate 
inflationary processes in the national currencies of 
these regions. As we know, inflation is not merely a 
problem of the monetary supply, but also of demand. 
Hence, even if the supply does not increase, if the 
demand for state fiat currency falls, its purchasing 
power also falls. By offering a way out in situations 
of economic and social repression, this type of cryp-
tocurrency may accelerate inflation of the state fiat 
currency in countries where the situation is convul-
sive (cf. Carrick 2016; Sayed and Abbas 2018).
Secondly, it is possible that this type of cryptocur-
rency could be converted into reserve assets by large 
Central Banks (Ammous 2018, 279-280). They could 
adopt this strategy for two reasons. On the one hand, 
to have more tools available to intervene in monetary 
markets, and on the other hand, to have an interna-
SEGUNDAS_IberianJournalOfTheHistoryOfEconomicThought7(1).indd   21 2/6/20   20:10
22 Sanz Bas, D. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 7(1) 2020: 15-28
tional means of payment accepted by all in the case 
of a world-wide conflict or crisis, a role also played 
by gold.
4. Stablecoins
4.1. What are Stablecoins?
The volatility of Bitcoin and the Altcoins has led to 
the development of a new type of cryptocurrency, 
“Stablecoins”. These cryptocurrencies are designed 
to minimise the volatility of their exchange value, 
and ideally to have a stable value (Mita et al. 2019). 
To achieve this, these cryptocurrencies can select di-
verse standards of value as a reference: fiat currencies 
(normally the dollar), commodities (gold, oil, etc.) 
and even a basket of different cryptocurrencies14. The 
reference asset most chosen is a state fiat currency.
Stablecoins can be classified into two groups, as a 
function of the strategy used to maintain their value 
over time:
• Collateralised Stablecoins: Each of these curren-
cies requires the existence of an issuing institution 
that, by managing collateral and actively inter-
vening in the money market, guarantees that the 
market price of the currency corresponds 1:1 with 
the price of the asset chosen as the reference. The 
economic nature of this type of Stablecoin is dif-
ferent from that of Bitcoin and the Altcoins (Rallo 
2019a). Collateralised Stablecoins are financial 
liabilities issued by a company, and their value is 
determined by the quality of the collateral and by 
the credibility of the issuer15. Therefore, posses-
sion of a Stablecoin collateralised with euros is 
like having a current account in Banco Santander 
in Spain. The only advantage of Banco Santander, 
compared to a company that issues Stablecoins, 
is that the bank’s liabilities are guaranteed by the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund for Credit Entities and, 
ultimately, by the European Central Bank. This 
means that having 1000 euros in a Banco Santand-
er account is practically the same as having 1000 
euros in cash, given the enormous security that 
the banking system now offers to individuals. 
Obviously, the circumstances are different for the 
holder of a collateralised Stablecoin.
• Non-collateralised Stablecoins: These cryptocur-
rencies are governed by an algorithm that mod-
ifies their supply to guarantee that their market 
14 The reason for using a basket of cryptocurrencies as a reference standard for a Stablecoin is that the fluctuation in the overall value of many different 
cryptocurrencies will necessarily be less than that of a single cryptocurrency.
15 We should remember that Bitcoin and the Altcoins are intangible assets and their value is derived directly from the appreciation of their users.
16 At the same time, as an additional argument that is not applicable in our present context, a stable currency generates greater macroeconomic sta-
bility. Hayek was aware that this fact alone would not drive individuals to choose currencies with stable purchasing power. However, the Austrian 
economist considered that regions that used stable currencies would tend to be more prosperous and, over time, would tend to be imitated by other 
regions.
price corresponds 1:1 with the value of the asset 
chosen as a reference. This is intended to achieve 
a dynamic adjustment between supply and de-
mand for a cryptocurrency of this type. This type 
of Stablecoin is not yet in wide use. Note that 
these cryptocurrencies are intangible assets, un-
like collateralised Stablecoins.
Obviously, the potential attractiveness of Stable-
coins is high, since they offer many of the character-
istics of cryptocurrencies —speed, low commissions 
on transfers, anonymity— while they resolve theo-
retically their main defect, volatility. However, their 
popularity is still very low because of a general lack 
of acceptance of cryptocurrencies in the real-world 
economy and doubts about the stability of their value 
over time.
There is a strong connection between Stablecoins 
and the model described in Denationalization of mon-
ey (Porter and Rousse 2016, 156). Specifically, the 
Austrian economist was convinced that, in a context 
of monetary competition, the market would tend to 
select the currencies with the most stable purchasing 
power. Hayek (1990, 73-74) maintained that the main 
reason for this is that a currency with a more stable 
value would enable its users to minimise the inevita-
ble effects of uncertainty. This allows individuals to 
improve their ability to predict future events and to 
use business or personal accounting efficiently16. 
As mentioned above, the current importance of 
Stablecoins in the cryptocurrency market is second-
ary. In fact, there are experts who consider that Sta-
blecoins are not —and will never be— capable of 
achieving their aim, i.e., stable market values (Mita 
et al. 2019; Chohan 2019). Obviously, if their use be-
came general, this would demonstrate the accuracy 
of Hayek’s prediction about the public’s preferences.
In Denationalization of money Hayek develops 
several topics that help to understand the progress 
and the challenges of Stablecoins. Let us see what he 
can teach us.
4.2. Collateralised Stablecoins
Hayek (1990, section VIII) imagined that the liber-
alisation of currency production would give rise to 
the creation of issuing companies with characteristics 
like those that currently issue collateralised Stable-
coins. This type of cryptocurrency, therefore, is re-
markably similar to Hayek’s concept of private cur-
rencies. As a result, Denationalization of money of-
fers certain valuable insights that help to understand 
this type of Stablecoin:
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a) Trust. Unlike Bitcoin and the Altcoins, collater-
alised Stablecoins have a centralised structure. This 
means that this type of cryptocoin requires the ex-
istence of an issuing company that guarantees the 
dynamic equilibrium between the demand and the 
supply of the cryptocurrency, and hence of the stabil-
ity of its market price in relation to the chosen refer-
ence. For many analysts, this is undoubtedly one of 
the weak points of this type of Stablecoins, since they 
require that users trust the issuing entities. 
For Hayek, the problem of trust in the issuing 
entity —a problem that is also found in the differ-
ent public issuing monopolies— can be resolved via 
competition. In his words, “Competition would cer-
tainly prove a more effective constraint, forcing the 
issuing institutions to keep the value of their currency 
constant (in terms of a stated collection of commod-
ities)17, than would any obligation to redeem the cur-
rency in those commodities (or in gold). And it would 
be an infinitely cheaper method than the accumula-
tion and the storing of valuable materials” (Hayek 
1990, 48). 
This phenomenon can already be observed in 
the collateralised Stablecoins market. Currently, the 
most popular Stablecoin of this type is Tether, both 
in capitalisation volume and in daily transactions18. 
The issuing company of this cryptocurrency (Tether 
17 We shall go deeper into this below.
18 On April 5, 2020, according to CoinMarketCap, Tether was the fourth-largest cryptocurrency as regards market capitalisation ($6,185,093,696), 
with only Bitcoin ($124,372,363,025), Ethereum ($15,838,038,053) and XRP ($7,903,674,657) ahead of it.
19 It can be seen in Chart 2 that from July 2017 to March 2020, Tether’s capitalisation (blue line) has grown, due, among other motives, to the fall in 
value of Bitcoin. 
Ltd.) guarantees that the market price of its crypto-
currency will be 1:1 with respect to its different nom-
inal currencies, in Dollars, Euros or Yens. As a result, 
the holder of a 1 dollar-tether (its symbol is USTD) 
cannot exchange it directly with the company for 1 
dollar but is guaranteed that he/she can sell it on the 
market at this price. Consequently, in this case, pos-
sessing a tether, in theory, means possessing a dollar. 
This Stablecoin thus creates a bridge between state 
fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies. 
In recent years, Tether has become a key currency 
in the cryptocurrency market and is used by traders 
when they perceive risks. For example, if investors 
have invested capital in bitcoins and they believe that 
the price of bitcoins might drop, they can exchange 
them for tethers and so protect their capital; later 
when the uncertainty has passed, they can convert 
their tethers back into bitcoins19. As we can see, this 
way of investing avoids converting cryptocurrency 
into fiat currencies (dollars, etc.), with all the associ-
ated problems, such as slowness, legal impediments, 
taxes, etc.
Since April 2017, doubts have emerged regarding 
the ability of Tether Ltd to maintain the 1:1 parity 
with the different fiat currencies (euro, dollar, yen). 
The lack of credibility has at times caused serious 
fluctuations in its market value (see Chart 2). 
Chart 2. Market price of Tether (USDT) from 2015 to 2020 
Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether/
This situation has given rise, as it is natural, to oth-
er similar companies entering the market to displace 
Tether. These competitors include Paxos Standard 
(PAX), TrueUSD (TUSD) and Dai (DAI). In many 
of these cases, in order to gain the public’s trust, the 
issuing companies have attempted to offer additional 
guarantees, such as periodic external audits, and have 
even attempted to issue cryptocurrency backed 100% 
by state fiat currencies and redeemable in them, as is 
the case of TrueUSD. 
As Hayek predicted, competition acts as a system 
to uphold confidence in the issuing institutions.
b) The issuing process of collateralised Stablecoins. 
Hayek was aware that currency issuing companies 
could follow different routes to introduce their cur-
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rencies. However, with the intention of eliminating 
doubts about the viability of his proposal, he ex-
plained what he would do if he intended to introduce 
a new currency, the “private Swiss ducat”. Here we 
can find some guidelines that may be useful in the 
case of collateralised Stablecoins. Hayek (1990, 46-
47) affirmed that
The only legal obligation I would assume would be 
to redeem these notes and deposits on demand with, 
at the option of the holder, either 5 Swiss francs or 5 
D-marks or 2 dollars per ducat. This redemption value 
would however be intended only as a floor below which 
the value of the unit could not fall because I would an-
nounce at the same time my intention to regulate the 
quantity of the ducats so as to keep their precisely de-
fined purchasing power as nearly as possible constant. 
(…) And I would announce that I proposed from time 
to time to state the precise commodity equivalent in 
terms of which I intended to keep the value of the ducat 
constant, but that I reserved the right, after announce-
ment, to alter the composition of the commodity stand-
ard as experience and the revealed preferences of the 
public suggested. 
From this, we can deduce that Hayek thought it 
necessary that the new currency be perceived by the 
market as trustworthy. Consequently, he thought that 
a good strategy would be to create a floor value under 
which the value of the currency could not fall, and he 
announced a legal obligation to redeem this currency. 
At the same time, the issuing institution promised 
users that the new currency would have constant pur-
chasing power referred to a specific basket of goods 
—something that we shall explain below. This is es-
sential, because users need to know the specific pur-
chasing power of the new currency at the time it is 
issued. A currency only makes sense as a relationship 
of values. For this reason, the new currencies need a 
reference to past purchasing power20. 
Finally, we can see that the value of this curren-
cy is independent of the value of other currencies. 
Hayek specified that the issuing bank could modify 
the composition of the basket of goods chosen as the 
value standard, as indicated by the experience and 
preferences of the public. Here, we can deduce that 
for the Austrian, there was an inevitable business 
component in the management of a currency.
As a result, although the ultimate basis of Hayek’s 
model lay in competition, issuing companies would 
also have to care for the trustworthiness of their cur-
rencies as perceived by the market. Consequently, 
the better the audit processes or legal guarantees, the 
20 Hayek (1990, 31) clearly accepted Ludwig von Mises’ regressive theory of money: “It is probably impossible for pieces of paper or other tokens of 
a material itself of no significant market value to come to be gradually accepted and held as money unless they represent a claim on some valuable 
object. To be accepted as money they must at first derive their value from another source, such as their convertibility into another kind of money”. 
It has been alleged that Bitcoin has demonstrated that this theory is false, since this currency did not have a prior non-monetary value. However, 
this is not so, since in its origin, the first bitcoins had a status as collector’s items for the communities of cryptographers who attempted to “mine” 
bitcoins using their own computers, i.e., the first bitcoins had a prior non-monetary value for certain persons (Ammous 2018, 243-244).
21 All available information can be found in their web site: https://libra.org. The Libra “White Paper” makes especially interesting reading.
greater the acceptance of a centrally issued crypto-
currency. At the same time, Hayek believed that the 
promise by the issuing company to maintain a stable 
purchasing power over time was essential. 
To illustrate this, we can discuss the announced 
“launch” of Libra into the cryptocurrency market in 
autumn 2020. Libra is a collateralised Stablecoin that 
will be issued by a conglomerate of companies acting 
as the legal entity Libra Association (which includes 
Facebook, Spotify, Uber, Anchorage, Shopify, Ribbit 
Capital and others). This Stablecoin is backed by a 
basket of state fiat currencies and short-term finan-
cial instruments (Triple-A bonds, etc.). Since Face-
book is one of the companies promoting the creation 
of Libra, and the project is supported by other large 
companies, its launch has created expectations that it 
will be used massively. It has also created certain dis-
comfort among several international institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund or the European 
Union or the Bank for International Settlements (cf. 
CNBC 2019, min 5:27; Claeys and Demertzis, 2019, 
4-5). Following Hayek’s insights, the Libra Associa-
tion has published detailed information regarding the 
characteristics of its cryptocurrency, with the clear 
intention of gaining the confidence of the public21. 
When the moment comes, the Libra Association will 
announce the purchasing power of its cryptocoins so 
that users have a reference.
c) Collateral management. Hayek (1990, 49) ex-
plained that “To achieve its announced aim of main-
taining the purchasing power of its currency constant, 
the amount [of money] would have to be promptly 
adapted to any change of demand, whether increase 
or decrease”. This would only be possible via correct 
management of the collateral maintained by the issu-
ing company. In Denationalization of money, Hayek 
(1990, 50) offers several guidelines on how these 
companies’ assets should be managed. In his opin-
ion, the issuing bank “would have to be prepared, to 
maintain the value of the ducat [its liabilities], to buy 
back substantial amounts of ducats at the prevailing 
higher rate of exchange. This means that it would 
have to be able rapidly to liquidate investments of 
very large amounts indeed. These investments would 
therefore have to be chosen very carefully if a tem-
porary rush of demand for its currency were not to 
lead to later embarrassment when the institution that 
had initiated the development had to share the market 
with imitators”.
In view of this, we can deduce that Stablecoins 
must be backed by stable liquid assets. An asset of 
this type must be selected to guarantee the value of 
SEGUNDAS_IberianJournalOfTheHistoryOfEconomicThought7(1).indd   24 2/6/20   20:10
25Sanz Bas, D. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 7(1) 2020: 15-28
the currency. Only in this way can an issuing bank 
comply with its promise. 
If the bank used the issue of its cryptocurrency to 
acquire risky or low-liquidity assets —such as long-
term mortgages, junk bonds, stocks, etc.—, there 
could be situations in which, following a fall in the 
market price of its currency, it would not be able to 
withdraw sufficient money from the market to main-
tain its purchasing power without incurring heavy 
losses. In this situation, those assets would have to be 
sold at substantial discounts and this would endanger 
the financial viability of the issuing company. 
Hayek (1990, 50) indicated that managing these 
banks would be like how Central Banks manage their 
fiat currencies. 
Following these guidelines, it is not necessary for 
a Stablecoin issuing company to guarantee their con-
vertibility into other assets22. Quite simply, the value 
of their currency can be controlled if the issuing com-
pany can manage its assets adequately. In fact, the 
main risk for users of these Stablecoins is precisely 
bad management of the collateral by the issuing com-
pany. As we have noted, Hayek considered that the 
quality of the collateral would be guaranteed by the 
existence of fierce competition between the issuing 
companies.
d) Stability of value. As mentioned previously, Sta-
blecoins are intended to maintain a stable value over 
time. To achieve this, the issuing institutions work 
to maintain a fixed exchange rate with respect to a 
chosen asset, whatever this may be: a fiat currency, 
oil, gold, etc. As a result, the stability of the purchas-
ing power of these cryptocurrencies in relation to 
other goods in the economy will depend on how the 
purchasing power of the chosen reference standard 
evolves.
In the short term, we can say that Stablecoins that 
use real assets such as gold or oil as a reference will 
tend to be more volatile than those that use a fiat cur-
rency as a reference. In the long term, everything de-
pends on the evolution of monetary policy in devel-
oped countries. If the relatively moderate inflation of 
the last three decades is maintained, then it is possible 
that collateralised Stablecoins using fiat currencies as 
a reference standard may maintain a certain stability. 
It will all depend on how these nations deal with their 
future problems, such as the enormous accumulation 
of public debt, pensions and health costs in societies 
that are increasingly ageing, or the recent economic 
crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
In Denationalization of Money, Hayek insists 
forcefully that it is impossible for state fiat curren-
cies to maintain their purchasing power long term. In 
22 Most issuing companies of Stablecoins affirm that they have ample reserves of their chosen reference asset(s) to back their cryptocurrencies. In 
many cases, this does not mean that there is any possibility of converting the cryptocurrency into said asset, nor that 100% of its assets are of this 
type. However, there are some Stablecoins that are completely backed by assets and that can even be converted into them, so they act as though 
they were deposit certificates of these assets. When the assets are commodities, the possession of cryptocoins with these characteristics is a way of 
investing in these commodities while avoiding some intermediaries who operate in these markets. Digix Gold Token (DGX), in which 1 DGX can 
be redeemed for 1 gram of gold, would be a good example.
his words, “I do not think it an exaggeration to say 
that history is largely a history of inflation, and usu-
ally of inflations engineered by governments and for 
the gain of government” (Hayek 1990, 34). He even 
considers that democratic governments are even less 
capable of holding down inflation, given their contin-
uous temptation to manipulate the currency to bene-
fit certain groups or to achieve certain political-eco-
nomic objectives (Hayek 1990, 103). 
It should not be forgotten that this blunt statement 
was made during the 70s, amid a period of stagfla-
tion. Currently, the Central Banks have institutional 
constraints that have worked well to prevent them 
from mismanaging their currencies, at least regarding 
the inflation rate. It will be necessary to see whether 
the tendency of the last three decades is maintained, 
since this will undoubtedly affect the purchasing 
power of those Stablecoins that use fiat currencies as 
reference standards.  
4.3. Non-collateralised Stablecoins
A few comments are necessary about non-collateral-
ised Stablecoins. As we have explained, cryptocur-
rencies of this type are not governed by an issuing 
company. These cryptocurrencies are programmed 
so that the algorithm destroys some monetary units 
if their value drops below that of the reference asset 
(for example, 1 dollar) and creates new units if their 
price rises above that of the reference asset. In this 
way, the market price of the crytocoin corresponds 
1:1 with the value of the asset chosen as a reference. 
As we can see, the central element of such a crypto-
currency is the automatic nature of the mechanism 
that modifies its supply.
For many, the main advantage of this type of Sta-
blecoin is precisely that it is an asset (like Bitcoin 
and Altcoins), and so is not a liability of any agent. 
This avoids problems derived from lack of trust in 
an issuing company. The main disadvantages are in 
its operational complexity. Some examples of cryp-
tocurrencies of this type are Fragments, Carbon, and 
the now extinct Basis. 
It is not easy to know what Hayek would have 
thought about the future of this type of Stablecoin, 
given the technological leap involved. Probably, he 
would agree that via this protocol, it is possible to 
guarantee parity between the market price of the Sta-
blecoin and the chosen reference asset. However, he 
would certainly think that achieving this objective 
does not guarantee a stable value for such a currency 
in the medium and long term, due to the instability of 
the value of the reference assets in this term, which-
ever it may be. In the following section, we shall 
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analyse Hayek’s contributions as to how to achieve 
the objective of permanently stabilising the value of 
a currency.  
Regarding non-collateralised Stablecoins, it is in-
teresting to note that Hayek considered that manag-
ing a currency that aspired to maintaining a stable 
value over time —and not just parity with a reference 
asset— requires a certain degree of anticipation and 
business discretionality. In his words,
The dealings of an issue bank in other currencies 
would therefore never be a purely mechanical affair 
(buying and selling at constant prices) guided only by 
the observed changes in the purchasing power of the 
other currencies; nor could such a bank undertake to 
buy any other currency at a rate corresponding to its 
current buying power over the standard batch of com-
modities; but it would require a good deal of judge-
ment effectively to defend the short-run stability of 
one’s own currency, and the business will have to be 
guided in some measure by prediction of the future 
development of the value of other currencies (Hayek 
1990, 65-66).
So, very possibly, Hayek would reject the idea 
that a non-collateralised Stablecoin could be de-
signed that would be able to maintain a stable pur-
chasing power over time, due to the impossibility of 
creating an automatic protocol capable of emulating 
the criterion of a businessman in an uncertain world 
(Hayek 1945; Ametrano, 2016).
4.4. Hayek’s teachings on the search for a stable 
value
Considering the arguments of Denationalization of 
money, a comment should be made about the concept 
of the stability of the purchasing power of a currency 
that may help in the design of future Stablecoins. 
According to Hayek, in practice, it is not possi-
ble for goods or currencies to have perfectly stable 
purchasing powers over the course of time. The val-
ue or purchasing power can be defined as the rela-
tionship between two objects and, thus, there is no 
absolute concept of value. In this sense, “What we 
mean when we habitually but carelessly use such 
expressions as ‘Beer is more stable in value than 
beetroot’ (and this is the most we can ever assert 
with any meaning) is that the relative value of beer, 
or its rate of exchange, tends to remain more stable 
with a larger number of other goods or over longer 
periods, than is true of beetroot and many other 
goods” (Hayek 1990, 70).
Hayek (1990, 74-75) suggests that issuers of pri-
vate currencies would have to seek and establish a 
reference standard to adjust the value of their curren-
cy. In his system, state fiat currencies would not be a 
good reference asset, given that he predicted that this 
type of currency would suffer heavy depreciation due 
to the irruption of private competition.
Nor did he consider practical nor viable that cur-
rency issuers should use a basket of end consumer 
goods as a reference to adjust the purchasing power 
of their currencies. He gave two reasons:
1. The cost of living differs from one place to anoth-
er, and a private currency needs an international 
perspective.
2. There is a considerable temporal lapse between 
injections/withdrawals of money and the impact 
on the price of consumer goods. 
Hayek believed that currency issuers would find 
that the best way to guarantee that their currencies 
had a stable purchasing power was to use a combi-
nation of raw materials, agricultural products and 
semi-terminated and standardised industrial products. 
In his view, these goods are negotiated in internation-
al markets and their prices are clearly international-
ised. Additionally, these products are more sensitive 
to changes in economic conditions, and so corrective 
measures to alterations in their prices (contraction/
expansion of the amount of money) could be adopted 
earlier.
In this sense, following Hayek’s teachings, a Sta-
blecoin that aspired to having a stable value over time 
would have to use a basket of real goods as a refer-
ence, and not fiat currencies. We shall have to see 
whether the optimum basket of goods is, in effect, as 
predicted in Denationalization of money. 
In any case, it is obvious that, in the current state 
of the cryptocurrency market, Stablecoins —whether 
collateralised or not— that are linked to state fiat cur-
rencies do so in order to take advantage of the network 
effects that these currencies already possess (Luther 
2016). For now, Stablecoins only aspire to act as a 
bridge between state fiat currencies and Bitcoin and 
Altcoins, but not to be a substitute for existing state 
currencies. For that reason, issuing companies are 
offering the options that have the most potential for 
success amongst users. If circumstances change, the 
strategies of these companies would probably change 
too, and we could check how accurate or mistaken 
Hayek’s prediction was.
5. Conclusions
In this article, we have analysed the phenome-
non of cryptocurrencies from the viewpoint of the 
monetary contributions offered in Denationaliza-
tion of money. We have attempted to demonstrate 
that, contrary to what is frequently claimed, Hayek 
would reject the idea that Bitcoin and the Altcoins 
are currencies that could be accepted massively by 
the market. These cryptocurrencies can be classi-
fied as digital assets whose monetisation process 
will never be completed. According to Hayek, it 
can likely be demonstrated empirically that the 
existence of these cryptocurrencies tends to accel-
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erate the inflation processes of national currencies 
in those countries with convulsive situations, since 
they offer their citizens a new way to protect their 
wealth.
At the same time, we have discussed the clear con-
nection between issuing companies of collateralised 
Stablecoins and the private issuing banks described 
in Denationalization of money. From this connection, 
we have been able to draw conclusions that help to 
understand this type of cryptocurrency, such as the 
keys to managing the collateral assets, the role played 
by competition and the possible market entry routes 
of these currencies. 
Finally, we have concluded that it is probably im-
possible to design non-collateralised Stablecoins that 
can maintain a stable value over time, since this re-
quires a business component that is difficult to emu-
late in a computer algorithm. 
We would like to finish by saying that Denation-
alization of money is Hayek’s monetary legacy. As 
we have confirmed, this work does not just contain 
the mature monetary thought of an economist who 
dedicated his entire life to the study of money. It is 
a clairvoyant guide for understanding the new world 
of monetary competition that we are headed towards 
and in which we already live. 
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